CmdID

CmdID / Programs / Windows

coregen.exe

Microsoft Common Language Runtime native compiler file version info (xCyclopedia)

LOLBAS Execute, AWL Bypass 2 ATT&CK techniques 3 documented commands 2 known copies with hashes

Opens CmdID with your command. It is read in your browser and sent nowhere.

How coregen.exe is abused

documented by LOLBAS

Execute T1055 Process Injection

dummy_assembly_name

-l

Execute T1055 Process Injection

dummy_assembly_name

AWL Bypass T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution

dummy_assembly_name

-l

Each abuse is LOLBAS's category and the options and words it uses; the full write-up is on LOLBAS's page for coregen.exe.

3 documented commands

from LOLBAS, each read by CmdID

Execute T1055 Process Injection User privileges

Loads the target .DLL in arbitrary path specified with /L.

coregen.exe /L {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll} dummy_assembly_name
Identify

Execute T1055 Process Injection User privileges

Loads the coreclr.dll in the corgen.exe directory (e.g. C:\Program Files\Microsoft Silverlight\5.1.50918.0).

coregen.exe dummy_assembly_name
Identify

AWL Bypass T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution User privileges

Loads the target .DLL in arbitrary path specified with /L. Since binary is signed it can also be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions.

coregen.exe /L {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll} dummy_assembly_name
Identify

None of the 3 commands CmdID reads trips a Sigma process-creation rule. These commands and their descriptions are from LOLBAS’s entry for coregen.exe, by Martin Sohn Christensen, at commit 2056cb766250 of 2026-09-26, under the GPL-3.0 and LOLBAS’s notice, with no warranty. Changed: Markdown is shown formatted. The source is in lolbas-gtfobins-commands.json.gz, and the full entry is on LOLBAS’s page for coregen.exe. CmdID reads each with LOLBAS’s placeholders filled in: a URL as https://example.com/file, a share as \\192.0.2.10\share\file, a path as C:\Data\file and a command as calc.exe.

What detects it

Sigma process creation rules
T1055Process Injection
T1218System Binary Proxy Execution

Is it the real coregen.exe?

file version info and known copies
Installed inC:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Silverlight\5.1.50918.0\
C:\Program Files\Microsoft Silverlight\5.1.50918.0\
Signed byMicrosoft Corporation
ProductMicrosoft Silverlight, Microsoft Corporation
DescriptionMicrosoft Common Language Runtime native compiler

2 known copies

5.1.50918.0 built by: SL_V5_SVC · C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Silverlight\5.1.50918.0\coregen.exe · signed by Microsoft Corporation

412a6b755b2029126d46e7469854add3faa850f5a4700dd1e078fcc536ca418a

5.1.50918.0 built by: SL_V5_SVC · C:\Program Files\Microsoft Silverlight\5.1.50918.0\coregen.exe · signed by Microsoft Corporation

e0344bc6c6a47d1ad11ec3ce98c48df07dc80b5f6337bbca155491ee0f814a1f

From the file’s version info and the copies recorded by xCyclopedia (MIT). A copy in another folder, signed by someone else or with another hash is not necessarily malicious, but it is worth a closer look. In Ceplin, "<sha256>".whatis() says which known copy a hash is.