CmdID

CmdID / Rules / Windows

Greenbug Espionage Group Indicators

A Sigma rule for process creation on Windows, from SigmaHQ’s emerging threats rules, by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems).

critical 3 ATT&CK techniques

What it looks for

its detection, as SigmaHQ writes it
detection:
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith:
      - ':\ProgramData\adobe\Adobe.exe'
      - ':\ProgramData\oracle\local.exe'
      - '\revshell.exe'
      - '\infopagesbackup\ncat.exe'
      - ':\ProgramData\comms\comms.exe'
  selection_msf:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File'
      - '\msf.ps1'
  selection_ncat:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'infopagesbackup'
      - '\ncat'
      - '-e cmd.exe'
  selection_other:
    CommandLine|contains: 'L3NlcnZlcj1'
  selection_powershell:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'system.Data.SqlClient.SqlDataAdapter($cmd); [void]$da.fill'
      - '-nop -w hidden -c $k=new-object'
      - '[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials;IEX '
      - ' -nop -w hidden -c $m=new-object net.webclient;$m'
      - '-noninteractive -executionpolicy bypass whoami'
      - '-noninteractive -executionpolicy bypass netstat -a'
  condition: 1 of selection_*

The rule’s detection, its selections and fields in order of name. The whole rule, with its references and false positives, is on SigmaHQ, by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), under the Detection Rule License 1.1. CmdID evaluates it on a command line alone: a test on what a command line cannot show, such as the parent process or the user, is not met.

None of the everyday examples and documented commands on CmdID’s program pages trips it. To see whether a command line does, paste it into CmdID.

ATT&CK

the techniques it is tagged with
T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer