Suspicious Autorun Registry Modified via WMI

detection:
  selection_execution_cmd:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
      - '\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
      - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'reg'
      - ' add '
  selection_execution_img:
    - Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
    - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
    - ParentImage|endswith: '\wmiprvse.exe'
  selection_suspicious_paths_1:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - ':\Perflogs'
      - ':\ProgramData'''
      - ':\Windows\Temp'
      - ':\Temp'
      - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
      - '\AppData\Roaming'
      - ':\$Recycle.bin'
      - ':\Users\Default'
      - ':\Users\public'
      - '%temp%'
      - '%tmp%'
      - '%Public%'
      - '%AppData%'
  selection_suspicious_paths_user_1:
    CommandLine|contains: ':\Users\'
  selection_suspicious_paths_user_2:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '\Favorites'
      - '\Favourites'
      - '\Contacts'
      - '\Music'
      - '\Pictures'
      - '\Documents'
      - '\Photos'
  condition: all of selection_execution_* and (selection_suspicious_paths_1 or (all of selection_suspicious_paths_user_*))

The rule’s detection, its selections and fields in order of name. The whole rule, with its references and false positives, is on SigmaHQ, by Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), under the Detection Rule License 1.1. CmdID evaluates it on a command line alone: a test on what a command line cannot show, such as the parent process or the user, is not met.

None of the everyday examples and documented commands on CmdID’s program pages trips it. To see whether a command line does, paste it into CmdID.