CmdID / Rules / Windows

Suspicious CrushFTP Child Process

A Sigma rule for process creation on Windows, from SigmaHQ’s emerging threats rules, by Craig Sweeney, Matt Anderson, Jose Oregon, Tim Kasper, Faith Stratton, Samantha Shaw, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems).

medium 3 ATT&CK techniques 10 programs it names

What it looks for

its detection, as SigmaHQ writes it

detection:
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\bash.exe'
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\cscript.exe'
      - '\mshta.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\powershell_ise.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
      - '\sh.exe'
      - '\wscript.exe'
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\crushftpservice.exe'
  condition: all of selection_*

The rule’s detection, its selections and fields in order of name. The whole rule, with its references and false positives, is on SigmaHQ, by Craig Sweeney, Matt Anderson, Jose Oregon, Tim Kasper, Faith Stratton, Samantha Shaw, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), under the Detection Rule License 1.1. CmdID evaluates it on a command line alone: a test on what a command line cannot show, such as the parent process or the user, is not met.

None of the everyday examples and documented commands on CmdID’s program pages trips it. To see whether a command line does, paste it into CmdID.

Programs and files it names

their pages here

bash.execmd.execscript.exemshta.exewscript.exepowershellpowershell_isepowershell.exepowershell_ise.exesh.exe

ATT&CK

the techniques it is tagged with

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

T1059.003Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application

Suspicious CrushFTP Child Process

What it looks for

Programs and files it names

ATT&CK

Other rules for T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell