Potential SMB Relay Attack Tool Execution
A Sigma rule for process creation on Windows, by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems).
critical 1 ATT&CK technique
What it looks for
detection:
filter_hotpotatoes:
Image|contains:
- 'HotPotatoes6'
- 'HotPotatoes7'
- 'HotPotatoes '
selection_juicypotato_enum:
CommandLine|contains: '.exe -c "{'
CommandLine|endswith: '}" -z'
selection_pe:
Image|contains:
- 'PetitPotam'
- 'RottenPotato'
- 'HotPotato'
- 'JuicyPotato'
- '\just_dce_'
- 'Juicy Potato'
- '\temp\rot.exe'
- '\Potato.exe'
- '\SpoolSample.exe'
- '\Responder.exe'
- '\smbrelayx'
- '\ntlmrelayx'
- '\LocalPotato'
selection_script:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Invoke-Tater'
- ' smbrelay'
- ' ntlmrelay'
- 'cme smb '
- ' /ntlm:NTLMhash '
- 'Invoke-PetitPotam'
- '.exe -t * -p '
condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
The rule’s detection, its selections and fields in order of name. The whole rule, with its references and false positives, is on SigmaHQ, by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), under the Detection Rule License 1.1. CmdID evaluates it on a command line alone: a test on what a command line cannot show, such as the parent process or the user, is not met.
None of the everyday examples and documented commands on CmdID’s program pages trips it. To see whether a command line does, paste it into CmdID.
ATT&CK
T1557.001Adversary-in-the-Middle: Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay