CmdID

CmdID / Rules / Windows

HackTool - UACMe Akagi Execution

A Sigma rule for process creation on Windows, by Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems).

high 1 ATT&CK technique

What it looks for

its detection, as SigmaHQ writes it
detection:
  selection_hashes_sysmon:
    Hashes|contains:
      - 'IMPHASH=767637C23BB42CD5D7397CF58B0BE688'
      - 'IMPHASH=14C4E4C72BA075E9069EE67F39188AD8'
      - 'IMPHASH=3C782813D4AFCE07BBFC5A9772ACDBDC'
      - 'IMPHASH=7D010C6BB6A3726F327F7E239166D127'
      - 'IMPHASH=89159BA4DD04E4CE5559F132A9964EB3'
      - 'IMPHASH=6F33F4A5FC42B8CEC7314947BD13F30F'
      - 'IMPHASH=5834ED4291BDEB928270428EBBAF7604'
      - 'IMPHASH=5A8A8A43F25485E7EE1B201EDCBC7A38'
      - 'IMPHASH=DC7D30B90B2D8ABF664FBED2B1B59894'
      - 'IMPHASH=41923EA1F824FE63EA5BEB84DB7A3E74'
      - 'IMPHASH=3DE09703C8E79ED2CA3F01074719906B'
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\Akagi64.exe'
      - '\Akagi.exe'
  selection_pe:
    - Product: 'UACMe'
    - Company:
        - 'REvol Corp'
        - 'APT 92'
        - 'UG North'
        - 'Hazardous Environments'
        - 'CD Project Rekt'
    - Description:
        - 'UACMe main module'
        - 'Pentesting utility'
    - OriginalFileName:
        - 'Akagi.exe'
        - 'Akagi64.exe'
  condition: 1 of selection_*

The rule’s detection, its selections and fields in order of name. The whole rule, with its references and false positives, is on SigmaHQ, by Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), under the Detection Rule License 1.1. CmdID evaluates it on a command line alone: a test on what a command line cannot show, such as the parent process or the user, is not met.

None of the everyday examples and documented commands on CmdID’s program pages trips it. To see whether a command line does, paste it into CmdID.

ATT&CK

the techniques it is tagged with
T1548.002Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control