CmdID

CmdID / Rules / Windows

Code Execution via Pcwutl.dll

A Sigma rule for process creation on Windows, by Julia Fomina, oscd.community.

medium 1 ATT&CK technique 1 program it names

What it looks for

its detection, as SigmaHQ writes it
detection:
  selection_cli:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'pcwutl'
      - 'LaunchApplication'
  selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
    - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
  condition: all of selection_*

The rule’s detection, its selections and fields in order of name. The whole rule, with its references and false positives, is on SigmaHQ, by Julia Fomina, oscd.community, under the Detection Rule License 1.1. CmdID evaluates it on a command line alone: a test on what a command line cannot show, such as the parent process or the user, is not met.

Command lines that trip it

documented abuse, read by CmdID

The commands LOLBAS or GTFOBins documents for pcwutl.dll trip it: each is on its program’s page, read by CmdID.

Programs and files it names

their pages here
rundll32.exe

ATT&CK

the techniques it is tagged with
T1218.011System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32

Other rules for T1218.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32

APT29 2018 Phishing Campaign CommandLine Indicators · Equation Group DLL_U Export Function Load · EvilNum APT Golden Chickens Deployment Via OCX Files · HackTool - F-Secure C3 Load by Rundll32 · CobaltStrike Load by Rundll32 · Potential Emotet Rundll32 Execution · Fireball Archer Install · IcedID Malware Suspicious Single Digit DLL Execution Via Rundll32 · Kapeka Backdoor Execution Via RunDLL32.EXE · Potential Raspberry Robin CPL Execution Activity · Rhadamanthys Stealer Module Launch Via Rundll32.EXE · DLL Call by Ordinal Via Rundll32.EXE