CmdID / Rules / Windows

NotPetya Ransomware Activity

A Sigma rule for process creation on Windows, from SigmaHQ’s emerging threats rules, by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tom Ueltschi.

critical 3 ATT&CK techniques 1 program it names

What it looks for

its detection, as SigmaHQ writes it

detection:
  selection_perfc_keyword:
    - '\perfc.dat'
  selection_rundll32:
    CommandLine|endswith:
      - '.dat,#1'
      - '.dat #1'
      - '.zip.dll",#1'
    Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
  selection_specific_pattern:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'wevtutil cl Application & fsutil usn deletejournal /D C:'
      - 'dllhost.dat %WINDIR%\ransoms'
  condition: 1 of selection_*

The rule’s detection, its selections and fields in order of name. The whole rule, with its references and false positives, is on SigmaHQ, by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tom Ueltschi, under the Detection Rule License 1.1. CmdID evaluates it on a command line alone: a test on what a command line cannot show, such as the parent process or the user, is not met.

None of the everyday examples and documented commands on CmdID’s program pages trips it. To see whether a command line does, paste it into CmdID.

Programs and files it names

their pages here

rundll32.exe

ATT&CK

the techniques it is tagged with

T1003.001OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

T1218.011System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32

T1685.005Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event Logs

NotPetya Ransomware Activity

What it looks for

Programs and files it names

ATT&CK

Other rules for T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory