CmdID

CmdID / Rules / Windows

Potential Regsvr32 Commandline Flag Anomaly

A Sigma rule for process creation on Windows, by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems).

medium 1 ATT&CK technique 1 program it names

What it looks for

its detection, as SigmaHQ writes it
detection:
  filter_main_flag:
    CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -n '
  selection:
    CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -i:'
    Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
  condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*

The rule’s detection, its selections and fields in order of name. The whole rule, with its references and false positives, is on SigmaHQ, by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), under the Detection Rule License 1.1. CmdID evaluates it on a command line alone: a test on what a command line cannot show, such as the parent process or the user, is not met.

Command lines that trip it

documented abuse, read by CmdID

The commands LOLBAS or GTFOBins documents for regsvr32.exe trip it: each is on its program’s page, read by CmdID.

Programs and files it names

their pages here
regsvr32.exe

ATT&CK

the techniques it is tagged with
T1218.010System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32

Other rules for T1218.010 System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32

Potential APT-C-12 BlueMushroom DLL Load Activity Via Regsvr32 · Potential EmpireMonkey Activity · Potentially Suspicious Regsvr32 HTTP IP Pattern · Potentially Suspicious Regsvr32 HTTP/FTP Pattern · Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution From Remote Share · Potentially Suspicious Child Process Of Regsvr32 · Regsvr32 Execution From Potential Suspicious Location · Regsvr32 Execution From Highly Suspicious Location · Regsvr32 DLL Execution With Suspicious File Extension · Scripting/CommandLine Process Spawned Regsvr32