Potential Defense Evasion Via Rename Of Highly Relevant Binaries
A Sigma rule for process creation on Windows, by Matthew Green - @mgreen27, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), frack113.
high 1 ATT&CK technique 21 programs it names
What it looks for
detection:
filter:
Image|endswith:
- '\certutil.exe'
- '\cmstp.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\ie4uinit.exe'
- '\finger.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\msiexec.exe'
- '\msxsl.exe'
- '\powershell_ise.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\psexec.exe'
- '\psexec64.exe'
- '\psexec64a.exe'
- '\PSEXESVC.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\reg.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\wermgr.exe'
- '\wmic.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
selection:
- Description: 'Execute processes remotely'
- Product: 'Sysinternals PsExec'
- Description|startswith:
- 'Windows PowerShell'
- 'pwsh'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'certutil.exe'
- 'cmstp.exe'
- 'cscript.exe'
- 'IE4UINIT.EXE'
- 'finger.exe'
- 'mshta.exe'
- 'msiexec.exe'
- 'msxsl.exe'
- 'powershell_ise.exe'
- 'powershell.exe'
- 'psexec.c'
- 'psexec.exe'
- 'psexesvc.exe'
- 'pwsh.dll'
- 'reg.exe'
- 'regsvr32.exe'
- 'rundll32.exe'
- 'WerMgr'
- 'wmic.exe'
- 'wscript.exe'
condition: selection and not filter
The rule’s detection, its selections and fields in order of name. The whole rule, with its references and false positives, is on SigmaHQ, by Matthew Green - @mgreen27, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), frack113, under the Detection Rule License 1.1. CmdID evaluates it on a command line alone: a test on what a command line cannot show, such as the parent process or the user, is not met.
Command lines that trip it
The commands LOLBAS or GTFOBins documents for winrm.vbs trip it: each is on its program’s page, read by CmdID.
Programs and files it names
ATT&CK
T1036.003Masquerading: Rename Legitimate Utilities