CmdID

CmdID / Rules / Windows

Renamed ZOHO Dctask64 Execution

A Sigma rule for process creation on Windows, by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems).

high 4 ATT&CK techniques

What it looks for

its detection, as SigmaHQ writes it
detection:
  filter_main_legit_name:
    Image|endswith: '\dctask64.exe'
  selection:
    Hashes|contains:
      - 'IMPHASH=6834B1B94E49701D77CCB3C0895E1AFD'
      - 'IMPHASH=1BB6F93B129F398C7C4A76BB97450BBA'
      - 'IMPHASH=FAA2AC19875FADE461C8D89DCF2710A3'
      - 'IMPHASH=F1039CED4B91572AB7847D26032E6BBF'
  condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*

The rule’s detection, its selections and fields in order of name. The whole rule, with its references and false positives, is on SigmaHQ, by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), under the Detection Rule License 1.1. CmdID evaluates it on a command line alone: a test on what a command line cannot show, such as the parent process or the user, is not met.

None of the everyday examples and documented commands on CmdID’s program pages trips it. To see whether a command line does, paste it into CmdID.

ATT&CK

the techniques it is tagged with
T1036Masquerading
T1055.001Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection
T1202Indirect Command Execution
T1218System Binary Proxy Execution

Other rules for T1036 Masquerading

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