CmdID

CmdID / Rules / Windows

Suspicious NTLM Authentication on the Printer Spooler Service

A Sigma rule for process creation on Windows, by Elastic (idea), Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems).

high 1 ATT&CK technique 2 programs it names

What it looks for

its detection, as SigmaHQ writes it
detection:
  selection_cli:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'spoolss'
      - 'srvsvc'
      - '/print/pipe/'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'C:\windows\system32\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie'
      - 'http'
  selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
    - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
  condition: all of selection_*

The rule’s detection, its selections and fields in order of name. The whole rule, with its references and false positives, is on SigmaHQ, by Elastic (idea), Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems), under the Detection Rule License 1.1. CmdID evaluates it on a command line alone: a test on what a command line cannot show, such as the parent process or the user, is not met.

None of the everyday examples and documented commands on CmdID’s program pages trips it. To see whether a command line does, paste it into CmdID.

Programs and files it names

their pages here

ATT&CK

the techniques it is tagged with
T1212Exploitation for Credential Access