CmdID

CmdID / Rules / Windows

Suspicious Spool Service Child Process

A Sigma rule for process creation on Windows, by Justin C. (@endisphotic), @dreadphones (detection), Thomas Patzke (Sigma rule).

high 2 ATT&CK techniques 37 programs it names

What it looks for

its detection, as SigmaHQ writes it
detection:
  spoolsv:
    IntegrityLevel:
      - 'System'
      - 'S-1-16-16384'
    ParentImage|endswith: '\spoolsv.exe'
  suspicious_cmd:
    Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
  suspicious_cmd_filter:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '.spl'
      - 'route add'
      - 'program files'
  suspicious_net:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\net.exe'
      - '\net1.exe'
  suspicious_net_filter:
    CommandLine|contains: 'start'
  suspicious_netsh:
    Image|endswith: '\netsh.exe'
  suspicious_netsh_filter:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'add portopening'
      - 'rule name'
  suspicious_powershell:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
  suspicious_powershell_filter:
    CommandLine|contains: '.spl'
  suspicious_rundll32_cli:
    CommandLine|endswith: 'rundll32.exe'
  suspicious_rundll32_img:
    - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
    - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
  suspicious_unrestricted:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\gpupdate.exe'
      - '\whoami.exe'
      - '\nltest.exe'
      - '\taskkill.exe'
      - '\wmic.exe'
      - '\taskmgr.exe'
      - '\sc.exe'
      - '\findstr.exe'
      - '\curl.exe'
      - '\wget.exe'
      - '\certutil.exe'
      - '\bitsadmin.exe'
      - '\accesschk.exe'
      - '\wevtutil.exe'
      - '\bcdedit.exe'
      - '\fsutil.exe'
      - '\cipher.exe'
      - '\schtasks.exe'
      - '\write.exe'
      - '\wuauclt.exe'
      - '\systeminfo.exe'
      - '\reg.exe'
      - '\query.exe'
  condition: spoolsv and ( suspicious_unrestricted or (suspicious_net and not suspicious_net_filter) or (suspicious_cmd and not suspicious_cmd_filter) or (suspicious_netsh and not suspicious_netsh_filter) or (suspicious_powershell and not suspicious_powershell_filter) or all of suspicious_rundll32_* )

The rule’s detection, its selections and fields in order of name. The whole rule, with its references and false positives, is on SigmaHQ, by Justin C. (@endisphotic), @dreadphones (detection), Thomas Patzke (Sigma rule), under the Detection Rule License 1.1. CmdID evaluates it on a command line alone: a test on what a command line cannot show, such as the parent process or the user, is not met.

None of the everyday examples and documented commands on CmdID’s program pages trips it. To see whether a command line does, paste it into CmdID.

Programs and files it names

their pages here

ATT&CK

the techniques it is tagged with
T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
T1203Exploitation for Client Execution