CmdID

CmdID / Rules / Windows

AWL Bypass with Winrm.vbs and Malicious WsmPty.xsl/WsmTxt.xsl

A Sigma rule for process creation on Windows, by Julia Fomina, oscd.community.

medium 1 ATT&CK technique

What it looks for

its detection, as SigmaHQ writes it
detection:
  contains_format_pretty_arg:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'format:pretty'
      - 'format:"pretty"'
      - 'format:"text"'
      - 'format:text'
  contains_winrm:
    CommandLine|contains: 'winrm'
  image_from_system_folder:
    Image|startswith:
      - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
      - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
  condition: contains_winrm and (contains_format_pretty_arg and not image_from_system_folder)

The rule’s detection, its selections and fields in order of name. The whole rule, with its references and false positives, is on SigmaHQ, by Julia Fomina, oscd.community, under the Detection Rule License 1.1. CmdID evaluates it on a command line alone: a test on what a command line cannot show, such as the parent process or the user, is not met.

Command lines that trip it

documented abuse, read by CmdID

The commands LOLBAS or GTFOBins documents for winrm.vbs trip it: each is on its program’s page, read by CmdID.

ATT&CK

the techniques it is tagged with
T1216System Script Proxy Execution