Proxy Execution Via Wuauclt.EXE
A Sigma rule for process creation on Windows, by Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Sreeman, FPT.EagleEye Team.
high 1 ATT&CK technique 3 programs it names
What it looks for
detection:
filter_main_generic:
CommandLine|contains: ' /UpdateDeploymentProvider UpdateDeploymentProvider.dll '
filter_main_uus:
CommandLine|contains:
- ':\Windows\UUS\Packages\Preview\amd64\updatedeploy.dll /ClassId'
- ':\Windows\UUS\amd64\UpdateDeploy.dll /ClassId'
filter_main_winsxs:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ':\Windows\WinSxS\'
- '\UpdateDeploy.dll /ClassId '
filter_main_wuaueng:
CommandLine|contains: ' wuaueng.dll '
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'UpdateDeploymentProvider'
- 'RunHandlerComServer'
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\wuauclt.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'wuauclt.exe'
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
The rule’s detection, its selections and fields in order of name. The whole rule, with its references and false positives, is on SigmaHQ, by Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Sreeman, FPT.EagleEye Team, under the Detection Rule License 1.1. CmdID evaluates it on a command line alone: a test on what a command line cannot show, such as the parent process or the user, is not met.
Command lines that trip it
The commands LOLBAS or GTFOBins documents for wuauclt.exe trip it: each is on its program’s page, read by CmdID.