CmdID

CmdID / Rules / Windows

Potential Arbitrary Command Execution Using Msdt.EXE

A Sigma rule for process creation on Windows, by Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems).

high 1 ATT&CK technique 1 program it names

What it looks for

its detection, as SigmaHQ writes it
detection:
  selection_cmd_answerfile_flag:
    CommandLine|contains: ' PCWDiagnostic'
  selection_cmd_answerfile_param:
    CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -af '
  selection_cmd_inline:
    CommandLine|contains: 'IT_BrowseForFile='
  selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: '\msdt.exe'
    - OriginalFileName: 'msdt.exe'
  condition: selection_img and (selection_cmd_inline or all of selection_cmd_answerfile_*)

The rule’s detection, its selections and fields in order of name. The whole rule, with its references and false positives, is on SigmaHQ, by Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), under the Detection Rule License 1.1. CmdID evaluates it on a command line alone: a test on what a command line cannot show, such as the parent process or the user, is not met.

Command lines that trip it

documented abuse, read by CmdID

The commands LOLBAS or GTFOBins documents for msdt.exe trip it: each is on its program’s page, read by CmdID.

Programs and files it names

their pages here
msdt.exe

ATT&CK

the techniques it is tagged with
T1202Indirect Command Execution

Other rules for T1202 Indirect Command Execution

Indirect Inline Command Execution Via Bash.EXE · Indirect Command Execution From Script File Via Bash.EXE · Potential Arbitrary File Download Via Cmdl32.EXE · Suspicious High IntegrityLevel Conhost Legacy Option · Uncommon Child Process Of Conhost.EXE · Potentially Suspicious Child Processes Spawned by ConHost · Suspicious ZipExec Execution · Suspicious Cabinet File Execution Via Msdt.EXE · Potential Arbitrary File Download Using Office Application · Potentially Suspicious Office Document Executed From Trusted Location · Potential Arbitrary DLL Load Using Winword · Renamed PAExec Execution