CmdID

CmdID / Rules / Windows

Renamed PAExec Execution

A Sigma rule for process creation on Windows, by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jason Lynch.

high 1 ATT&CK technique

What it looks for

its detection, as SigmaHQ writes it
detection:
  filter_main_known_location:
    - Image|endswith: '\paexec.exe'
    - Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\PAExec-'
  selection:
    - Description: 'PAExec Application'
    - OriginalFileName: 'PAExec.exe'
    - Product|contains: 'PAExec'
    - Hashes|contains:
        - 'IMPHASH=11D40A7B7876288F919AB819CC2D9802'
        - 'IMPHASH=6444f8a34e99b8f7d9647de66aabe516'
        - 'IMPHASH=dfd6aa3f7b2b1035b76b718f1ddc689f'
        - 'IMPHASH=1a6cca4d5460b1710a12dea39e4a592c'
  condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*

The rule’s detection, its selections and fields in order of name. The whole rule, with its references and false positives, is on SigmaHQ, by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jason Lynch, under the Detection Rule License 1.1. CmdID evaluates it on a command line alone: a test on what a command line cannot show, such as the parent process or the user, is not met.

None of the everyday examples and documented commands on CmdID’s program pages trips it. To see whether a command line does, paste it into CmdID.

ATT&CK

the techniques it is tagged with
T1202Indirect Command Execution

Other rules for T1202 Indirect Command Execution

Indirect Inline Command Execution Via Bash.EXE · Indirect Command Execution From Script File Via Bash.EXE · Potential Arbitrary File Download Via Cmdl32.EXE · Suspicious High IntegrityLevel Conhost Legacy Option · Uncommon Child Process Of Conhost.EXE · Potentially Suspicious Child Processes Spawned by ConHost · Suspicious ZipExec Execution · Potential Arbitrary Command Execution Using Msdt.EXE · Suspicious Cabinet File Execution Via Msdt.EXE · Potential Arbitrary File Download Using Office Application · Potentially Suspicious Office Document Executed From Trusted Location · Potential Arbitrary DLL Load Using Winword