CmdID

CmdID / Rules / Windows

Detection of PowerShell Execution via Sqlps.exe

A Sigma rule for process creation on Windows, by Agro (@agro_sev) oscd.community.

medium 2 ATT&CK techniques 1 program it names

What it looks for

its detection, as SigmaHQ writes it
detection:
  filter_image:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\sqlagent.exe'
  selection_image:
    - Image|endswith: '\sqlps.exe'
    - OriginalFileName: 'sqlps.exe'
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\sqlps.exe'
  condition: selection_parent or (selection_image and not filter_image)

The rule’s detection, its selections and fields in order of name. The whole rule, with its references and false positives, is on SigmaHQ, by Agro (@agro_sev) oscd.community, under the Detection Rule License 1.1. CmdID evaluates it on a command line alone: a test on what a command line cannot show, such as the parent process or the user, is not met.

None of the everyday examples and documented commands on CmdID’s program pages trips it. To see whether a command line does, paste it into CmdID.

Programs and files it names

their pages here
sqlps.exe

ATT&CK

the techniques it is tagged with
T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
T1127Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution

Other rules for T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

Potential APT FIN7 Exploitation Activity · MERCURY APT Activity · TropicTrooper Campaign November 2018 · UNC2452 Process Creation Patterns · Command Line Execution with Suspicious URL and AppData Strings · Suspicious File Execution From Internet Hosted WebDav Share · Cmd.EXE Missing Space Characters Execution Anomaly · Powershell Executed From Headless ConHost Process · Suspicious CrushFTP Child Process · Exploited CVE-2020-10189 Zoho ManageEngine · Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048) · Potential Exploitation of GoAnywhere MFT Vulnerability